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Abstract
This paper studies the choice of monetary policy regime in a small open economy
with noise traders in forex markets. We focus on two simple rules: xed exchange
rates and ination targeting. We contrast the above two rules against optimal policy
with commitment under productivity shocks. In general, the presence of noise traders
increases the desirability of a xed exchange rate regime. We also evaluate the welfare
impact of Tobin taxes in such a milieu. These taxes help unambiguously in the absence
of productivity shocks; their welfare impact under productivity shocks depends on the
monetary regime in place and trade elasticity between domestic and foreign goods.
Keywords: Noise traders; Fixed exchange rates; Tobin taxes, Optimal monetary policy.
JEL Classication: E42, E52, F41
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1 Introduction
There exists a large literature which focuses on market microstructure models that examine
the role of noise traders in generating excess volatility in the foreign exchange market. This
paper incorporates noise traders into a small open economy with incomplete markets and
examines the role of monetary policy and Tobin taxes in such a setup. Within this setting, we
welfare-rank two simple rules, namely a xed exchange rate regime (PEG) and an ination
rate targeting regime (IT) by comparing them with optimal policy under commitment. Our
objective is to identify the simple rule that in terms of welfare is closest to the optimal
monetary policy under commitment. In addition, we examine the welfare implications of
imposing Tobin taxes in such a setup.
Our results show that the di¤erences in welfare across these regimes can be mapped with
the real exchange rate volatility that the regimes allow relative to what optimal policy calls
for. The analysis shows that in the face of productivity shocks, optimal monetary policy calls
for a signicantly lower volatility of the real exchange rate in the presence of noise traders.
It therefore follows that a PEG outperforms an IT regime when there are noise traders in the
economy. Further, we nd in such a setup, the impact of Tobin taxes on welfare is critically
dependent on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The work in this paper builds on the large literature which has sought to analyze monetary
policy objectives in an open economy. An important debate in this literature has centered
around the issue of whether monetary policy should focus only on targeting domestic ination
rates or should stabilization of the exchange rate also be a policy objective. Clarida et
al. (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005), in seminal contributions show that the open
economy version of optimal monetary policy problem is isomorphicto its closed economy
counterpart. In this case, absent cost push shocks, a policy of strict domestic ination
targeting is always optimal. This literature laid the intellectual foundation for ination
targeting to be widely adopted in open economies.
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in their seminal study, however, document that many devel-
oping countries which on paper classify themselves as ination targeting regimes, in practice,
actively stabilize their exchange rate. These countries exhibit unusually low exchange rate
volatility, high volatility in interest rate and forex reserve prompting the authors to conclude
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that there is extensive fear of oating.
Contributions, among others, by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Pappa (2004) and De Paoli (2009a) have sought to explain the observed stabilization
of the exchange rate by emphasizing the role of the terms of trade externality. These
authors have argued that, in an environment where domestic and foreign goods are not per-
fect substitutes, a strict form of domestic ination targeting may not be optimal and some
degree of terms of trade (or exchange rate) stabilization is welfare enhancing. Others such
as Caballero et al. (2005) and Levy Yeyati et al.(2006) have argued that extensive liabil-
ity dollarization may lead central banks to avoid exchange rate exibility fearing nancial
instability and bankruptcies.
Our paper instead emphasizes the role of noise traders for the equilibrium terms of trade
variability and its implications for an optimal monetary policy design. We build on De Paoli
(2009b) who emphasizes the structure of asset markets in trying to explain monetary policy
objectives in an open economy. Importantly, De Paoli shows that in an economy with a high
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, the PEG regime is preferred
under complete nancial markets whereas an IT regime is welfare superior under incomplete
markets. In contrast, we show that if there are noise traders in the economy, then even
with incomplete markets and a high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods, a PEG outperforms an IT regime.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model with noise
traders. Section 3 studies and welfare ranks the alternative monetary policy arrangements.
Section 4 provides a summary of the results and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
The framework is a small open economy with incomplete markets and closely follows De
Paoli (2009b). The world economy is populated with a continuum of household of unit mass,
where the fraction of the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to the home country,
H; and the remainder of the world population in the segment [n; 1] belongs to the foreign
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country, F . The utility function of the representative household in country H is
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where Ct is individual consumption stream,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, 
is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, t is the shock to productivity,
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The parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
produced goods, CH and CF . The parameter determining home consumers preferences for
foreign goods, (1  v) is a function of the relative size of the foreign economy, (1  n), and
of the degree of openness, ; more specically, we follow De Paoli (2009b) and Sutherland
(2002) in assuming (1   ) = (1   n) and  = n. Further, it is assumed that  6= ,
which gives rise to home bias in consumption. It turns out that this feature gives rise
to deviations from purchasing power parity. Home bias, as in their papers implies that
home agents give a higher weight to home goods and foreign agents attach a higher weight
to foreign goods. The home (foreign) consumption of domestic and foreign produced goods
is given by CH (CH) and CF (C

F ), respectively, where:
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where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated goods. The correspond-
ing price indices are
P =
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where PX(P X) is the price sub-index for goods produced in country X in the domestic
(foreign) currency. The sub-indices are given by
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Following De Paoli (2009b), we assume the law of one price holds for each individual di¤er-
entiated goods and is given by:
p (h) = Sp (h) and p (f) = Sp (f) (9)
where St denotes the nominal exchange rate dened as the amount of home currency units
(peso) required to buy one unit of the foreign currency (dollar). It follows from equations
(7)-(9) that
PH = SP

H (10)
PF = SP

F :
Substituting equation (10) in equation (5) we get
P = S

P 1 H + (1  )P 1 F
1=(1 )
(11)
Comparing equation (11) with equation (6) and noting  6=  it is easy to see that P 6= SP .
In other words owing to the presence of home bias, PPP does not hold even when the law
of one price holds.
The preference structure leads to the total demand for a di¤erentiated good h, produced
in country H
ydt (h) =

pt (h)
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 (
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  "
(1  ) (Ct) + 

1
Qt
 
Ct
#)
(12)
where the real exchange rate Q  SP =P .
Following De Paoli (2009b), the demand side of the small open economy (n! 0) can be
written in log-linear form as
yt = (1  ) ct + ct + qt (13)
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where y is the home output, q is the real exchange rate and ct is the foreign consumption,
all expressed in log-linear terms. The parameter  = (2 )
1  , measures the sensitivity of
domestic demand to movements in the real exchange rate and is a function of the degree of
openness in the economy .
2.2 Price setting
Prices are set following the standard Calvo formulation the optimal choice of producers who
can set price at time t, can be summarized by
Et
8>>><>>>:
X
T
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where  is the fraction of rms do not change prices and ep (h) is the optimally adjusted
price. Therefore, the price index evolves as
(PH;t)
1  = P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) ept (h)1  (15)
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003) and De Paoli (2009b), it can be shown that (14) and
(15) can be rst order approximated by
t = k

ct + yt +

1  qt   t

+ Ett+1 (16)
where k = (1  ) (1  ) = (1 + ). Equation (16) is the supply side of the economy
represented in log linear form. The price setting problem facing rms in the rest of the world
is identical to those of the domestic rms.
2.3 International Markets
The budget constraint of the individual domestic household in country H is given by,
PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
= ft +Bt 1 + (1  Tt)PH;tYt + PH;t t (17)
where Pt is the overall price index in the home country, PH;t is the price index of the
domestically produced good, it is the nominal interest rate, Tt is the income tax,  t is
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the government transfer and Bt is the non-state-contingent risk-free bonds denominated
in the local currency (peso). We follow Devereux and Engel (2002) in assuming that home
households can directly trade only in peso-nominal bonds but cannot trade directly in dollar-
denominated bonds. All trading in dollar-bonds is carried out by specialized forex dealers
who act in the interest of home households. Households take ft or the net payment they
receive from the dealers as given. The net payment ft is the prot from carry trading,
denominated in peso. Given the above specication, we can write the small open economys
optimal intertemporal choice as
Uc(Ct) = (1 + it)Et

Uc(Ct+1)
Pt
Pt+1

(18)
As the foreign economy is large and closed, foreign households are assumed to trade only in
dollar-bonds. Their intertemporal choice is given by
Uc(C

t ) = (1 + i

t )Et

Uc(C

t+1)
P t
P t+1

(19)
As in Jeanne and Rose (2002), forex traders are modeled as overlapping generation of in-
vestors who live for two periods. In the rst period of their lives they borrow funds from
the households and purchase dollar-denominated bonds BF . In the following period, the
trader sells the foreign bonds and transfers all proceeds net of taxes, to its owners. Thus,
the transfer ft from the traders to households every period is given by:
ft = $tBF;t 1   PH;t 1t 1 (20)
$t =

St
 
1 + {^t 1
  St 1 (1 + it 1) =  1 + {^t 1 (21)
where $t is the net return from the trading before tax. The rst component of $t denotes
the amount households receive in period t from the foreign exchange dealer. The second
component denotes the pre-tax amounts repaid to the household. St denotes the nominal
exchange rate, and  denotes the sum of the forex trading tax that the government collects
from the dealers. Further, to avoid non-stationarity of key variables such as consumption
and current account, we assume, in the spirit of Schmidtt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), that the
world interest rate applicable to the small open economy is subject to an intermediation
cost,  , increasing in net real foreign debt position  0 < 0. i.e.
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where Ejt refers to the conditional expectation of trader j at time t, and $t+1 the net return
from trading. Following the literature, we assume1 the real foreign trading tax  (X) =
0:5X2. The traders rst order condition is given by:
0 = Ejt
"
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#
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 S
2
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j
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Equations (22) and (23) show that the optimal trading strategy chosen by the foreign ex-
change trader depends on their exchange rate expectations. Following De Long et al. (1990)
and Jeanne and Rose (2002), we assume that a fraction, & 2 [0; 1], of the foreign exchange
dealers are noise traders and the remaining (1 &) are informed. The formers expectations
about the future returns are noisy in the sense that they may deviate from the rational
expectations by a noise shock. This will lead to di¤erences in the expectations between
noise traders and informed traders resulting in irrational, non-fundamentals-driven trade.
This non-fundamental trade is useful for discussing potential gains from nancial transac-
tion taxes: if noise trading introduces an excess volatility in the real economy, a transaction
tax which may be expected to curb noise trading may thereby also reduce noise-trade-driven
excess real volatility. Formally, the informed traders have the model-consistent rational
forecast,
EIt [qt+1   qt] = Et [qt+1   qt] (24)
and the noise traders have
ENt [qt+1   qt] = Et [qt+1   qt] + vt (25)
where vt is white noise with its variance 2v .
1This assumption prevents traders from receiving subsidies by taking a short position. This also implies
that the tax is imposed at the end of the period.
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2.4 Market Clearing
The market clearing of the domestic bond market requires
Bt
1 + it
=
StBF;t
1 + {^t
(26)
where the left-hand side is the amount of fund lent by household and the right-hand side
is the amount of foreign bond purchased in the domestic currency. The government runs a
balanced budget, which implies
0 = PH (TtYt    t) + PH;t 1t 1 (27)
Combining equations (17), (26) and (27), we get the economys current account which can
be expressed in log linear form as (See Appendix A.1 for details)
bt = bt 1   
1  qt + yt   ct (28)
Combining equations (23)-(25), we get (See Appendix A.2 for details)
( + ) bt = Et
 
ct+1   ct
  Et (ct+1   ct) + Etqt+1 + &vt (29)
which can be expressed in in log-linear form as
it   it = Etst+1 + &vt   ( + ) bt (30)
where & is the fraction of noise traders,  denotes the elasticity of borrowing cost with
respect to net real foreign bond. The above equation represents the uncovered interest
parity condition in the economy. We therefore interpret vt; the noise term as a shock to the
risk premium. Equations (13), (16), (28) and (30) are a summary of the models equilibrium
conditions. An analogous set of expressions characterize the world economy. In what follows,
we solely focus on shocks to the small open economy. It is assumed that the world economy
is in steady state and ct = 

t = 0.
3 Monetary Policy
Having characterized the decentralized equilibrium, we are now set to evaluate and compare
alternative monetary policies under risk premium and productivity shocks. We rst derive
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the policymakers objective function as a second order approximation of the households
utility function and then study optimal monetary policy under commitment. The two sim-
ple rules of xed exchange rates, and domestic ination targeting are addressed thereafter.
Following De Paoli (2009b), we derive the loss function of the central bank as a second order
approximation of the utility function:
L =
1
2
[yt qt]Ly [yt qt]
0+ [yt qt]Let+
1
2
l
2
t (31)
where Ly = [lyy lyq; lyq lqq], Le = [ly; lq]. The coe¢ cients ls are functions of fundamental
parameters of the economy (See Appendix B for details). Essentially, the loss function
indicates that the central bank aims at balancing uctuations in output, ination and real
exchange rate. Intuitively, the presence of staggered prices and monopolistic competition
implies there are gains in minimizing output and ination uctuations. Finally, the open-
economy side friction introduces incentive to stabilize the exchange rate to minimize the
wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of production.
3.1 Optimal Policy
Given this loss function, the Lagrangian for the optimal policy under commitment is the loss
function (31) subject to equations (13), (16), (28) and (30) as below:
min L =
X
t [L
+ '1;t

t   k
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ct + yt +

1  qt   "t

  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qtg
+ '3;t

( + ) bt   
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The optimal policy then is characterized by the system of the following rst order conditions
0 = '1;t + lt
0 = lyyyt + lyqqt + lyt   k'1;t + '2;t   '4;t
0 = lyqyt + lqqqt + lqt   k 
1  '1;t   '2;t +

'3;t   '3;t 1


+

1  '4;t
0 =  k'1;t   (1  )'2;t   

'3;t   '3;t 1


+ '4;t
0 =  Et '4;t+1 + ( + )

'3;t
As shown by De Paoli (2009b), when  =  = 0, it can be shown that the optimal policy
can be written as
0 = Et

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
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and xTt+1denotes a targeting value for variable x. According to the above rule, optimal policy
responds to movements in output, ination and real exchange rate. It is worth noting that
the e¢ cient level of output in this special case is given by yTt =  

 + 1 


W 1y t and
therefore a function only of productivity shocks.2
More importantly, even though the weights W of optimal policy are a function of the
structural parameters of the model, one can show that the welfare is, in general, critically
e¤ected by the nature of the shock and the magnitude of the Tobin tax.
2As has been extensively noted in the literature, there are challenges to implementing this as a rule as
there are issues of determinacy that crop up.
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3.2 Impulse Response
We next characterize equilibrium dynamics as well as welfare under alternative policies when
the economy is subject to the risk premium shocks vt and productivity shocks t. Specically,
we compare the dynamics of ination, output, consumption and real exchange rate obtained
under optimal monetary policy with those obtained under two simple rules namely ination
targeting (IT, it = t)3 and the xed exchange rate (PEG, st = 0). These exercises are
conducted using the baseline parameters shown in Table 1. We then proceed to examine
how these responses are altered when we vary the magnitude of the Tobin tax.
3.2.1 Shocks to the risk premium
Consider now a temporary increase in the the risk premium vt. Notice that unlike the case of
the productivity shock, there is no change in the e¢ cient level of output in the case of a risk
premium shock. It follows that in this case, optimal policy calls for insulating the real side of
the economy from the shock. Figure 1.A shows that the movement in ination, output and
real exchange rates are minimal under optimal policy. In order to stabilize demand, optimal
policy raises interest rate to lower domestic consumption, which leads to higher savings and
higher bond holdings. Essentially optimal policy smooths the exchange rate and allows the
interest rate to rise (see equation 30). The rise in interest rate stabilizes demand and hence
ination.
In contrast, an IT regime allows the real exchange rate to depreciate strongly, resulting in
a sharp increase in demand. The dynamics under a PEG regime are similar to those exhibited
under optimal policy. By stabilizing the real exchange rate, the interest rates absorb the
risk premium shock under the PEG regime. The consequent rise in interest rate stabilizes
demand and ination. This is veried by Table 2, which reports standard deviations and the
welfare loss, expressed as a percentage of steady state consumption, under the alternative
monetary policy regimes. The lower ination and output variability under the PEG regime
results in it outperforming the IT regime.
3De Paoli (2009b) considers a strict ination targeting rule wherein domestic ination is always set to
zero. However, as has been documented in the literature, there are challenges to implementing this policy
as a simple rule as there are issues of determinacy. We therefore adopt the more practical exible ination
targeting rule.
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Table 2 shows that welfare under all regimes improves with an increase in Tobin tax.
Intuitively, an increase in Tobin tax reduces the demand for foreign bonds while a positive
risk premium shock increases the demand for foreign bonds. Ceteris paribus, raising Tobin
taxes o¤sets rise in vt in the forex market. As a result, required responses in policy interest
rate are muted, which in turn miminizes the adverse e¤ects on output and ination.
3.2.2 Productivity Shocks
Now consider a temporary rise in productivity. Figure 1.B shows that ination under the
optimal policy stays at while the output rises. Intuitively, a rise in productivity calls for
an increase in output as in De Paoli (2009b) due to an increase in its e¢ cient level. This is
engineered by a decrease in policy interest rate that also lets real exchange rate depreciate.
As a result, the demand for home goods rises, thus raising its output. Since the output,
domestic consumption, and real exchange rate comove with the productivity shock, the real
marginal cost and ination (see equation 16) remain stabilized.
Since the optimal policy entails ination stabilization, the dynamics exhibited by the IT
regime closely mimic those under the optimal policy. The PEG on the other hand, by unduly
stabilizing real exchange rate (Table 2), constrains interest rate and output movements. It
leads to a substantial deation and muted rise in domestic consumption and home output.
As a result, as in De Paoli (2009b), the IT regime welfare dominates PEG (Table 2 ).
As evident from Table 2, a positive Tobin tax reduces welfare under all regimes. In-
tuitively, as savings (and bond holdings) comove with productivity shock (income e¤ect) a
positive Tobin tax stabilizes nominal (and therefore real) exchange rates excessively relative
to what optimality commands.4
4As can be seen from equation (30), for a given intreest rate, a postive Tobin tax requires an appreciation
(depreciation) under positive (negative) productivity shock if b comoves with .
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3.3 Simultaneous Shocks
We next analyze the performance of alternative monetary policies and Tobin taxes when the
two shocks are turned on together. Consider the following structure of shocks
t = "t 1 + e;t (32)
vt = ev;t
where e;t and ev;t are uncorrelated i.i.d white noise shocks. Table 3 clearly indicates that
under this scenario the PEG dominates the IT regime regardless of the size of elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods (). For  > 1, productivity shocks call
for real exchange rate exibility with ination stability, whereas the risk premium shocks
require the opposite. For our baseline specication, exhibited in Table 1, it turns out that
risk premium shock takes precedence over productivity shock in the determination of opti-
mal policy response. As a result, the PEG dominates the IT regime for  = 2. The results
for  < 1, follow from De Paoli (2009b) who shows under incomplete markets and produc-
tivity shocks, a policy of exchange rate stabilization is welfare improving when the degree
of substitutability between home and foreign good is low. This is because a low elasticity
of substitution between imported and domestic goods reduces the negative income e¤ect of
terms of trade improvement on consumption. This welfare improving feature of the PEG
regime is compounded in our framework due to the presence of noise traders.
To summarize, we nd that when we add noise traders to the simple small open economy
incomplete markets framework of De Paoli (2009b), a PEG regime dominates an IT regime
under productivity shocks. Our results are in contrast to that of De Paoli, who shows that
the above result holds true only when  < 1.
Next consider an increase in Tobin taxes. Table 3 clearly shows that when  > 1;
increasing the Tobin tax causes welfare to fall under the PEG while it rises under the IT
regime. Recall from our preceding discussion that with only productivity shocks (but no
noise traders), the IT regime outperforms the PEG; now it is the presence of noise traders
in addition that makes the PEG superior. Imposing Tobin taxes in addition stabilize real
exchange rate excessively and thus reduces welfare under the PEG. In contrast, since the
IT performs poorly precisely because of real exchange rate instability, Tobin taxes help the
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IT perform better. On the other hand, when  < 1, imposing Tobin taxes improves welfare
irrespective of the regime in place. The result follows from the discussion in the preceding
paragraph where we established that exchange rate stabilization unambiguously improves
welfare when  < 1. Tobin taxes by stabilizing the real exchange rate therefore are welfare
enhancing under both regimes.5
4 Conclusions
Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, two classic rules, xed exchange rates and
ination targeting are studied and ranked by comparing them with the optimal monetary
policy under commitment in a small open economy with incomplete markets and noise traders
in the forex market. Second, we examine the impact of Tobin taxes under each of these
monetary policy regimes.
The key message of the paper is that the presence of noise traders in the forex market
increases the desirability of xed exchange rates vis-à-vis ination targeting, irrespective of
the trade elasticity between domestic and foreign goods. More specically, with noise traders
in the forex market and with shocks to productivity, a xed exchange rate regime dominates
ination targeting even when the two goods are substitutes, reversing the result highlighted
by De Paoli (2009b). The impact of Tobin taxes is found to be critically dependent upon
the elasticity of substitution between the goods. When domestic and foreign goods are
substitutes, these taxes overstablize the real exchange rate under a xed exchange rate regime
and perform poorly, whereas under ination targeting, they improve welfare by providing
some stability to the real exchange rate. On the other hand, when the domestic and foreign
goods are complements, Tobin taxes improve performance irrespective of the regime in place
a result which is in line with the ndings in De Paoli (2009b). A key drawback in this model
is that the number of noise traders in the market at any point assumed to be exogenous.
One potential direction for future research would be to endogenize the entry of noise traders
and examine its implications for monetary policy and Tobin taxes in a DSGE setup.
5In exercises not reported we also nd this result robust to changes in the variance and persistence of risk
premium shocks as well as trade openness and activeness of IT policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Current Account
In the Appendix, we follow De Paoli (2009b) in deriving rst and second order approxima-
tions to the equilibrium conditions of the model. Combining equations (17), (26) and (27),
we get the economys current account
PtCt +
StBF;t
1 +bit = StBF;t 1 + PH;tYt (A.1)
With a denition the real bond balance BR  SBFP and the domestic households Euler
equation

1 +bit 1 = Et Ct+1Ct   St+1St PtPt+1, (A.1) can be re-expressed as
Ct +
StBF;t
Pt (1 + {^)
=
Pt 1
Pt
St
St 1
St 1BF;t 1
Pt 1
+
PH;t
Pt
Yt
Ct +BR;tEt
"
Ct+1
Ct
 
St+1
St
Pt
Pt + 1
#
=
St
St 1
Pt 1
Pt
BR;t 1 +
PH;t
Pt
Yt
BR;tEt

C t+1
St+1
St
Pt
Pt + 1

= C t
St
St 1
Pt 1
Pt
BR;t 1 + C
 
t

PH;t
Pt
Yt   Ct

Furthermore, with Bt  BR;tEt
h
C t+1
St+1
St
Pt
Pt+1
i
, the current account can be rewritten as
Bt = Bt 1 + C
 
t

PH;t
Pt
Yt   Ct

(A.2)
The rst order log-linear approximation to the current account equation (A.2) around a
symmetric equilibrium with zero bond holdings is
bt = bt 1 + pH;t + yt   ct
where bt = Bt BB , B =
Y
 
Y
1  and pH;t = P^H;t   P^t. The second order approximation to (A.2)
is
bt = (1  )

b0yyt +
1
2
y0tByyt + +y
0
tBt

+ Etbt+1 + t:i:p+O
3 (A.3)
17
where
y0t =
h
yt ct pH;t qt
i
;
By =
2666664
 1   1 0
 1 1  2  0
 1   1 0
0 0 0 0
3777775
b0y =
h
 1 1  1 0
i
B0 = [ 0 0 0 0 ]
A.2 Uncovered interest parity
The rst order condition of the traders is given by
PH;t
Pt
S2tB
j
F;t
Pt
= Ejt
"


Ct+1
Ct
 
Pt
Pt+1
$t+1
#
After substituting the denition of $t and foreign households Euler equation, we get,
PH;t
Pt
StB
j
F;t
Pt
= Ejt
""


Ct+1
Ct
 
Pt
Pt+1
St+1
St
#
 
"


Ct+1
Ct
 
P t
P t+1
##
(A.4)
The noise traders information set is given by
ENt [qt+1] = Et [qt+1] + vt
qt+1 = st+1 + 

t+1   CPI;t+1
where CPI;t = log (Pt+1=Pt). Taking linear approximation of (A.4), we get
bjt = E
j
t
264  ct+1   ct    (ct+1   ct)  bt + st+1 + t+1   CPI;t+1| {z }
qt+1
375
= Et


 
ct+1   ct
   (ct+1   ct)  bt+ qt+1 +D&jvt
where D&j = 1 if j is a noise trader, 0, otherwise. Aggregating this over j, we have
( + ) bt = 
 
ct+1   ct
   (ct+1   ct) + qt+1 + &vt
where & =
P
j D&j = fraction of noise traders.
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B Derivation of Loss function
Next, we proceed to derive the Loss function. We begin by obtaining a second order approx-
imations for the Phillips equation, demand and real exchange rate. These are then useful in
obtaining an expression for the loss function.
B.1 Phillips curve
The second order approximation to the Phillips curve is given by
V0 = E0
X
t

a0yyt +
1
2
y0tAyyt + y
0
tAt +
1
2
a
2
t

+ t:i:p+O3 (B.1)
where
a0y =
h
   1 0
i
Ay =
2666664
 (2 + )   1 0
  2  0
 1   1 0
0 0 0 0
3777775
A0 =
h
  (1 + ) 0 0 0
i
a = (1 + )=k
Vt = k
 1 t + v2t + vztZt
For v, vz, and Zt, see Appendix to Benigno and Benigno (2003).
B.2 Demand
The rst order approximation to the demand for small open economy goods is
yt =  pH;t + (1  ) ct + ct + qt (B.2)
The second order approximation is
0 =
X
t

d0yyt +
1
2
y0tDyyt + y
0
tDt

+ t:i:p+O3 (B.3)
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where
d0y =
h
 1 1     
i
Dy =
2666664
0 0 0 0
0 (1  ) 0   (1  )
0 0 0 0
0   (1  ) 0 2 (1  )
3777775
D0 =
h
0 0 0 0
i
B.3 Real exchange rate
The consumer price index Pt =

(1  )P 1 H;t + P 1 F;t
 1
1  can be log-linear approximated
by
pH;t =   
1  qt (B.4)
and second order approximated by
0 = E0
X
t

f 0yyt +
1
2
y0tFyyt + y
0
tFt

+ t:i:p:+O3 (B.5)
where
f 0y =
h
0 0  (1  )  
i
F 0y =  (   1)
2666664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1
0 0  1 1  
1 
3777775
F 0 =
h
0 0 0 0
i
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B.4 Loss function
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003) and De Paoli (2009b), the utility function can be
second order approximated by
U = E0
X
t
t
"
C1 t
1    
1
n
Z n
0
 t
 
yjt
1+
1 + 
#
' UCCE0
X
t

w0yyt  
1
2
y
0
tWyyt   y0twt  
1
2
w
2
t

+ t:i:p+O3
where
Wy =
2666664
1+

0 0 0
0   1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3777775
y0t =
h
yt ct pH;t qt
i
;
w0y =
h
  1

1 0 0
i
;
w =  

Using a second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions, the rst order term, w0yyt
is eliminated and the loss function is obtained:
L =  U ' UCCE0
X
t

1
2
y0tLyyt + ytLt +
1
2
l
2
t

+ t:i:p+O3
where
Ly = Wy + Lx1Ay + Lx2Dy + Lx3Fy + Lx4By
L = w + Lx1A + Lx2D + Lx3F + Lx4B
l = w + Lx1a
Lx  [ Lx1; Lx2; Lx3; Lx4 ]
=
h
ay dy fy by
i 1
wy
To write the loss function in terms of y, q, and , we apply the following transformation
using (B.4) and (B.2):
yt = N
h
yt qt
i0
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where
N =
2666664
1 0
1
1    (2 )(1 )2
0   
1 
0 1
3777775
Therefore, the loss function can be reduced into
L = UcCE0
X
t

1
2
h
yt qt
i
Ly
h
yt qt
i0
+
h
yt qt
i
L+
1
2
l
2
t

+ t:i:p+O3
where
Ly = N
0LyN 
24 lyy lyq
lyq lqq
35
L = N
0L =
h
ly; lq
i
and
lyy =
( 1 + + + ) ((1 + ( 2 + ))( 1 + )2   ( 1 + +  (2  5+ 22)) )
( 1 + )2((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lyq =
( 1 + + + ) (1 + 2(3  4) + 3( 1 + ) + ( 3 + 4))
( 1 + )3((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lqq =  
( 1 + + + )
0@ ( 1 + )2 (1  3+ 2) + 2( 2 + )3
 ( 1 + ) ( 2 + 3(1 + )  2(5 + 4) + (6 + 4))
1A
( 1 + )4((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
ly =   (1 + ( 2 + ))( 1 + + + )
((1 + ( 2 + )  ) +   2+ ( 1 + ))
lq = 0
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Table 1: Baseline Parameters 
Parameter Value Remarks 
λ 0.4 Trade openness 
β 0.99 Discount factor (annual real interest rate of 4%) 
η 1.6 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
α 0.75 Calvo sticky price parameter: average of 4 quarters of price rigidity 
θ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
δ 0.01 Elasticity of risk premium with respect to foreign debt size 
σ 6 Elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate goods 
ρ 2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
γ θλ (2 - λ) / (1 - λ)  
k (1 - αβ)(1 - α)/α(1 + ση)  
𝜌 𝜖  0.95 Persistence of productivity shock 
𝜎𝜖 , 𝜎𝑣  0.07 Standard deviation of productivity and risk premium shocks 
𝜒  2.5 Activeness of interest rate targeting 
 
 
Table 2: Welfare Loss and Variance of Key Variables 
Policy Parameter Welfare loss 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒒) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒚) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝝅) 
Risk premium Shock      
IT 𝜏 = 0 0.0018 9.95E-04 2.54E-03 6.17E-07 
PEG  -4.45E-07 9.26E-07 8.78E-05 1.05E-07 
OP  -0.00022 8.34E-05 5.41E-05 2.00E-09 
IT 𝜏 = 0.01 0.0017 9.54E-04 2.45E-03 6.04E-07 
PEG  -1.00E-06 8.83E-07 8.56E-05 1.00E-07 
OP  -0.00021 7.95E-05 5.11E-05 2.07E-09 
Productivity Shock      
IT 𝜏 = 0 -0.0155 0.0017 0.0117 1.23E-05 
PEG  -0.0130 0.0011 0.0083 8.97E-06 
OP  -0.0189 0.0018 0.0124 1.16E-08 
IT 𝜏 = 0.01 -0.0131 0.0015 0.0112 1.50E-05 
PEG  -0.0121 0.0010 0.0081 8.18E-06 
OP  -0.0171 0.0016 0.0120 7.62E-09 
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Table 3: Welfare Loss and Variance When Both Shocks Are Turned On 
Policy 𝝉 = 𝟎 Parameter Welfare loss 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒒) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒚) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝝅) 
IT  𝜃=2 0.1025 0.0464 0.1687 2.27E-04 
PEG   0.0334 0.0017 0.0368 5.03E-05 
IT  𝜃=0.5 -0.2076 0.0078 0.0006 1.05E-05 
PEG   -0.4845 0.0016 0.0006 3.04E-06 
 
Policy 𝝉 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 Parameter Welfare loss 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒒) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝒚) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝝅) 
IT  𝜃=2 0.0930 0.0407 0.1522 1.80E-04 
PEG   0.0349 0.0015 0.0364 4.68E-05 
IT  𝜃=0.5 -0.3157 0.0089 0.0007 1.52E-06 
PEG   -0.5249 0.0016 0.0006 3.28E-06 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response of Key Variables  
A. Risk Premium Shock 
 
B. Productivity Shock
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